Puntland security forces in the Cal Miskaad mountains during operations against ISIS, February 2025. File photograph. Somalia Ministry of Defense / Wikimedia Commons
Key judgements
• Puntland's security gains are real but reversible. The phase that would lock them in, building governance and institutions in cleared areas, has no clear owner.
• That gap is by design: US strategy has stepped back from state building, and no other partner has stepped in.
• The six months since May show what happens when the sequence breaks. As attention turned to the federal dispute, pressure on ISIS eased and reports pointed to the group rebuilding.
• Internal cohesion, rather than outside support, is the variable most likely to decide whether the hold succeeds.
In counterinsurgency, the hardest phase is rarely the first. Clearing territory is costly, but its progress is visible: operations carried out, leaders removed, ground retaken. Holding that ground is different. It takes administration, services and a security presence that communities accept as legitimate. It is slower and less visible, yet everything else rests on it. Iraq and Afghanistan both showed how quickly gains erode when the hold is neglected.
That lesson applies directly to Puntland. Washington's engagement now follows a clear sequence of security, then stability, then investment. The first phase is well under way. The question is what will be built on the ground that has been cleared, and by whom.
A framework set out in Washington
General Dagvin Anderson, commander of US Africa Command, has set out the sequence most clearly. Speaking after the Africa Strategic Dialogue in Washington on 29 October, he explained why a command with fewer resources was working more closely with civilian institutions: “We have to look at how we bridge into that stability and investment.” He returned to the theme at the Atlantic Council the next day.
The idea itself is familiar: the link between security and development. What is notable is who is making it, a military command openly acknowledging that its work is only the first step. Anderson did not single out Puntland, but few Somali partners fit the model more closely.
Security: real progress, but only the first step
AFRICOM's 2026 posture statement credits US fire support and surveillance with keeping ISIS-Somalia's leadership confined to caves in Puntland's mountains, while Puntland's own forces have carried the ground campaign in the Cal Miskaad range. In August, Garowe and Washington agreed to expand the US facility at Bosaso, extending cooperation into maritime security.
These are hard-won gains. But military operations can only degrade a threat; they cannot build the institutions that prevent its return. That task now moves to the centre.
A strategy that leaves the middle without an owner
The May 2026 US Counterterrorism Strategy says its Africa goals “depart from the nation-building and interventionist policies” of the past, and expects regional partners to take on more responsibility. In April, the State Department's senior Africa official told the Senate that the new approach puts partnership ahead of dependency.
This creates the central tension in the framework. Washington's model depends on stability to protect its security gains and enable investment, yet its own doctrine rules out the work that produces stability. The first and third phases have committed actors. The second, which connects them, has none. Unless someone takes ownership of it, the sequence risks stalling halfway.
“Insurgencies rarely need to win. They only need their opponents to look away.”
What holding the ground requires
The hold rests on four foundations, and each is currently incomplete. A unified security sector. Cleared areas stay secure only when the forces holding them answer to one accountable chain of command. Puntland's forces have shown they can take ground. Whether they can hold it as a single, coherent institution is less certain.
Credible local governance. Communities emerging from militant influence judge the state by how quickly it arrives: district administrations, local councils and trusted dispute resolution. Where that presence is slow or partial, the vacuum the militants left can reopen.
Visible public services. Schools, clinics, water and roads are the clearest evidence that the state has returned. They are also how communities measure whether the state offers more than the groups it displaced.
Durable institutions. Underlying all of this is the capacity of ministries and the civil service to plan, deliver and account for their work. Puntland's fiscal pressures make this the slowest foundation to build, and the easiest to neglect.
Partnerships that build the state
These foundations also define what useful partnership looks like. With no single partner claiming the stabilisation phase, Puntland has room to work with a wider range of partners, each supporting a defined priority, from security-sector reform to local governance and institutional training.
The measure of any such partnership is whether it strengthens Puntland's institutions or works around them. Support that runs through state systems, follows priorities set in Garowe and leaves lasting capacity behind reinforces self-governance. Support that bypasses the state risks recreating the dependency the US strategy itself warns against.
Internal cohesion: the test of the past six months
The cost of distraction is already visible. From May to November 2026, as Puntland's attention turned to its constitutional and electoral dispute with the federal government, there were no publicly declared US strikes against ISIS-Somalia, and reports by late May described renewed militant activity and a group rebuilding. ACLED found that armed clashes between federal-aligned and Puntland forces diverted resources from counterterrorism, while a deadly clash between security units in Bosaso in July pointed to strains within Puntland's own forces. Airstrikes on suspected Islamic State positions were reported again in November, in Qandala district, as Puntland forces pressed a renewed mountain offensive.
The timing does not prove cause, and AFRICOM has not explained the pause. But the pattern is consistent with a familiar lesson: insurgencies exploit any break in the sequence of clearing, holding and building. For Puntland, the main threat to the hold is less the strength of the insurgency than the cohesion of the state confronting it. Unified command over security forces, transparent governance and inclusive politics are not concessions to outside pressure. They are what make Puntland a partner others can rely on, and the strongest protection for its self-governance.
Investment as the outcome, not the starting point
Interest in Puntland's minerals, fisheries and oil is already visible, and the strategic case is real: its coastline sits on the Gulf of Aden, part of a corridor that carries an estimated 12 to 15 percent of global trade. But lasting investment follows stability. Secure routes, clear rules and trusted institutions are what turn interest into commitment.
Assessment
Puntland has done the hardest visible work. The next phase is quieter and matters more: building a state that holds the ground it has cleared. Three questions will decide whether that happens. Can Puntland unify and professionalise its security sector? Can it bring credible governance and services to liberated districts? And can it shape partnerships around its own priorities rather than those of others?
Washington has made clear that the next phase belongs to Puntland. The ground will be held by whoever is prepared to build on it.
Sources
The White House, 2026 US Counterterrorism Strategy (May 2026).
US Africa Command, 2026 Posture Statement to Congress.
N. Checker, Bureau of African Affairs, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (21 April 2026).
allAfrica, “Africom's Energy Conversation Brings Nigeria, Kenya Into Focus” (November 2026).
Atlantic Council, “General Dagvin R. M. Anderson on US strategy and security in Africa” (30 October 2026).
Atlantic Council, “Somalia is the dark horse in US defense and economic strategy”.
ACLED, “Is an internal security rift emerging in Puntland state?” (29 July 2026).
allAfrica, “Somalia: One Dead As Puntland Security Forces Clash in Bosaso” (July 2026).
New America, “Three Months Without a Strike Against the Islamic State in Somalia” (2026).
Somalia Today, report on renewed militant activity in Puntland (31 May 2026).
The Puntland Strategic and Policy Institute (PSPI) has presented “Puntland’s Strategic Middle Path,” a policy paper by Puntland First Movement Chairman Mustafe G. Guufe. The paper proposes an approach linking security, economic resilience and institution-building to preserve Puntland’s freedom to make its own decisions.